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I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2020, a man in his thirties from the State of
Washington, who had recently traveled to Wuhan, China, was
diagnosed with a novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”).1 COVID-19 was
a newly discovered strain of virus that could cause symptoms
ranging from a common cold to more severe diseases.2 The World
Health Organization eventually declared COVID-19 a global health
emergency.3 On February 29, 2020, the United States reported its

* Courtney Krznarich, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. I
would like to dedicate this case note to everyone who has lost a loved one to
COVID-19, especially those in underserved communities. Writing this case note
would not have been possible without the support of my friends and family back
in Wisconsin and my law school colleagues. Special thanks to my editor, Hudson
Cross, for his time and dedication to this case note.
1. Erin Schumaker, Timeline: How Coronavirus got Started, ABC NEWS
(Sept.
22,
2020),
www.abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirusstarted/story?id=69435165 [perma.cc/RVM7-M26U].
2. What Does “Novel” Coronavirus Mean?, BATON ROUGE GENERAL (Mar. 24,
2020), www.brgeneral.org/news-blog/2020/march/what-does-novel-coronavirusmean-/ [perma.cc/CW52-3UAZ].
3. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y.
TIMES, www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [perma.cc/JVK8KZAV] (last updated Mar. 17, 2021).
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first COVID-19 related death.4 By March 3, COVID-19 had infected
more than 90,000 people globally and killed about 3,000.5 The
deadly virus continued to spread and, on March 13, President
Trump declared a national emergency for the United States.6 Two
days later, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)
recommended no gatherings of fifty people or more and many
businesses were forced to close indefinitely.7 Unlike other World
leaders,8 President Trump did not declare a national lockdown, so
state governors across the country were tasked with creating their
own plans to stop the spread of COVID-19.9 In Wisconsin, Governor
Tony Evers decided that Wisconsin’s Department of Health Services
(“DHS”) would lead the fight against COVID-19.10 Unfortunately for
Wisconsinites, the DHS’s plan was short lived due to the
irresponsibility of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.11
This Note will illuminate how the Wisconsin Supreme Court
erred in its decision in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm.12 Part II of
this Note will cover the background of the DHS in Wisconsin and
what led to the erroneous decision in Palm. Part III will explain
why the court’s evaluation of Secretary-elect Andrea Palm’s
issuance of Emergency Order 28 was flawed. It will also explain how
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices’ personal disfavor for the
broad discretion granted through Wisconsin Statute Section 252.02

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. (stating that in other countries, like Italy, officials locked down ten
towns after a cluster of cases suddenly surged southeast of Milan).
9. See Caitlin Oprysko, Trump on a Nationwide Lockdown: ‘I don’t Think
we’ll
ever
find
that
Necessary’,
POLITICO
(Mar.
20,
2020),
www.politico.com/news/2020/03/20/trump-coronavirus-nationwide-lockdown139330 [perma.cc/H7QM-HL6T] (stating that President Trump “shot down the
prospect for any kind of nationwide lockdown to contain the spread of
coronavirus, resisting a step that California, New York and now Illinois have
already taken.”); Rachel Treisman, How is each State Responding to COVID19?, NPR (Dec. 4, 2020), www.npr.org/2020/03/12/815200313/what-governorsare-doing-to-tackle-spreading-coronavirus [perma.cc/X8X5-3EKW] (“When the
coronavirus first struck the U.S. in March, every state implemented restrictions
aimed at limited its spread.”).
10. Office of Governor Tony Evers, Exec. Order No. 72 (Mar. 12, 2020),
www.docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/executive_orders/2019_tony_evers/202072.pdf [perma.cc/7RKM-X9B8] [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 72].
11. See Shawn Johnson, Wisconsin Supreme Court Overturns the State’s
Stay-At-Home
Orders,
NPR
(May
14,
2020),
www.npr.org/2020/05/14/855855749/wisconsin-supreme-court-overturns-thestates-stay-at-home-orders [perma.cc/C7HP-Z743] (stating that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that the stay-at-home order was unlawful).
12. Wis. Legis. v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900 (2020) (This case is referred to as
2020 WI 42 in Wisconsin Supreme Court filings, including briefs discussed
infra.).

96

UIC Law Review

[55:94

(“Chapter 252”) influenced them to evaluate its powers in a narrow
way. This part will also highlight what led the court to unjustly
strike Order 28 in its entirety and leave Wisconsinites with no
guidance on how to avoid contracting COVID-19. Finally, this Note
will offer a personal analysis of Palm, offering a more effective
statutory analysis and logical outcome to the issues presented in
the case.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE DHS IN WISCONSIN AND WHAT
LED TO PALM
The global outbreak of COVID-19 created many problems
within the United States of America.13 One of these problems was
deciding the response needed to keep Americans safe but also
reopen businesses that had closed.14 The Federal Government
initially struggled to create a comprehensive plan, but eventually
announced the Opening Up America Again Guidelines on April 16,
2020.15 This plan created a phased reopening based on the known
signs and symptoms of COVID-19.16 It did not mandate state action,
but rather, outlined proposed gating criteria17 for the states to
follow when deciding whether or not to allow businesses to reopen.18
Each state used these basic guidelines to create its own plan and
gating criteria to prevent the spread of COVID-19.19 States used
13. Everyone Included: Social Impact of COVID-19, DEP’T OF ECON. AND
SOC. AFFS., UNITED NATIONS, www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/everyoneincluded-covid-19.html [perma.cc/WZ5P-AX75] (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
14. In August 2020, three organizations proposed plans for the U.S. to gain
control over COVID-19. Janice Hopkins Tanne, Covid-19: US Needs a National
Plan to Fight Rising Infections, Experts Say, BMJ (Aug. 3, 2020),
www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m3072 [perma.cc/FhE7-SZBZ].
15. Kayleigh McEnany, Statement by the Press Secretary on COVID-19
Testing,
A M.
PRESIDENCY
PROJ.
(Apr.
27,
2020),
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-press-secretary-covid-19testing [perma.cc/2SST-5PKY].
16. Id.
17. What are the Gating Criteria?, COVID EXIT STRATEGY,
www.covidexitstrategy.org/definitions-and-criteria
[perma.cc/22PJ-UDXU]
(last visited Dec. 21, 2021) (“Gating criteria are the data-driven conditions each
region or state should satisfy before proceeding to a phased opening.”).
18. The Opening Up America Again plan included proposed gating criteria,
such as needing a downward trajectory of COVID-like syndromic cases reported
within a fourteen-day period; a downward trajectory of documented COVID-19
cases within a fourteen-day period; and hospitals being able to treat all patients
without crises care. Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, Trump Issues Guidelines for
Reopening State Economies Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 16,
2020), www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-04-16/trump-saysus-entering-next-phase-in-coronavirus-war-issues-guidelines-for-reopeningstates [perma.cc/8B6T-ZL2R].
19. See generally COVID-19 Resources for State Leaders, COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, www.web.csg.org/covid19/executive-orders/ [perma.cc/9V3E-2LTV]
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executive orders to compel participation in the reopening plans.20
For example, the State of Illinois created the Restore Illinois plan,21
which was described as a five-phased reopening plan guided by local
health metrics.22 In response, Governor Pritzker issued three
Executive Orders, which banned public gatherings, closed public
and private schools, and ordered Illinoisans to stay at home unless
they had a valid reason to leave.23 In California, Governor Newsom
declared a state of emergency and later ordered the California
Department of Public Health to issue guidance on the closures of
restaurants, bars, and wineries.24 States like Arkansas and
Massachusetts also decided to allow their state health departments
to create emergency orders.25
The state health departments issuing emergency orders are
part of the states’ executive branches, which creates some
separation of powers issues.26 The National Conference of State
Legislatures has explained that although state executive branches
need to be able to respond to emergencies in a timely manner, the
state legislative branches still have an important role in making
sure the powers exercised by the executive are not abused or in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.27 This conflict played
a large role in Palm because the Wisconsin Legislature was
(last visited Dec. 21, 2021) (showing each state’s plans and orders).
20. Id. These executive orders included declaring states of emergencies,
closing down public businesses, mandating citizens to wear masks, and
explaining how to distribute crucial personal-protective-equipment and
ventilators. Id.
21.
Restore
Illinois,
ILL.
DEP’T
OF
PUB.
HEALTH,
www.dph.illinois.gov/restore [perma.cc/65B4-P9AG] (last updated July 16,
2020).
22. Id. This five-phase plan created gating criteria such as the rate at which
the infection was spreading among Illinoisans getting tested, the number of
infected Illinoisans being admitted to hospital beds, and the rate of Illinoisans
recovering after a positive COVID-19 test. Id.
23. Office of Governor JB Pritzker, Exec. Order No. 2020-04 (Mar. 13, 2020),
www2.illinois.gov/Documents/ExecOrders/2020/ExecutiveOrder-2020-04.pdf
[perma.cc/68GP-WCTH]; Office of Governor JB Pritzker, Exec. Order No. 202005
(Mar.
13,
2020),
www2.illinois.gov/Documents/ExecOrders/2020/ExecutiveOrder-2020-05.pdf
[perma.cc/R8Z2-68JW]; Office of Governor JB Pritzker, Exec. Order No. 202010
(Mar.
20,
2020),
www2.illinois.gov/Documents/ExecOrders/2020/ExecutiveOrder-2020-10.pdf
[perma.cc/EC7L-F2QN].
24. COVID-19 Resources for State Leaders, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Legislative Oversight of Emergency Executive Powers, NCSL,
www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-oversight-ofexecutive-orders.aspx [perma.cc/4LEE-6EPJ] (last updated Nov. 2, 2021).
27. Id. In Wisconsin, a state of emergency shall not exceed sixty days, unless
it is extended by joint resolution of the legislature. Id. Also, the “executive order
may be revoked at the discretion of either the governor by executive order or
the legislature by joint resolution.” Id.
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seemingly trying to exercise a check on the executive power
exercised by the DHS.28

A. Events Leading to Palm
The Wisconsin Legislature itself created the DHS through
Wisconsin Statute Section 15.19.29 According to another Wisconsin
statute, some of the DHS’s powers are triggered when the governor
declares a public state of emergency.30 When the emergency is
declared, the DHS is then treated as the only public health
authority and given certain powers and duties specific to that
designation.31 However, Chapter 252 of the Wisconsin Code
contains separate authority for the DHS that is not dependent on a
governor’s emergency declaration.32
On March 12, 2020, Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers issued
Executive Order 72 (“Order 72”), which declared a health
emergency in response to COVID-19.33 Much like other states,
Order 72 designated the DHS as the lead agency to respond to the
emergency.34 Using the power vested to her through Order 72,
Andrea Palm, the DHS Secretary, issued Emergency Order 12.35
Emergency Order 12 ordered all individuals present within the
state of Wisconsin to stay at home with certain exceptions; this
issuance sparked no action from the Wisconsin Legislature.36 It was
Palm’s later issuance of Emergency Order 28 that compelled the
legislature to bring a petition against her.37 Order 28, titled “Safer
at Home Order,” differed only slightly from Order 12.38 In Order 28,
28. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 904.
29. WIS. STAT. § 15.19 (2020).
30. WIS. STAT. § 323.10 (2020).
31. Id.
32. See WIS. STAT. § 252.02 (2019) (stating that the DHS is granted broad
authority to control communicable diseases, such as the power to close schools
and limit public gatherings in order to control outbreaks and epidemics).
33. Exec. Order No. 72, supra note 10.
34. Id. Along with designating the DHS as the lead agency, Governor Evers
directed this agency to “take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent
and respond to incidents of COVID-19[.]” Id.
35. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 906.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 907. Emergency Order 28 prohibited all forms of travel except what
Palm deemed essential; ordered all businesses to cease activities except for
minimum operations that Palm deemed basic; prohibited all public and private
gatherings; closed all K-12 schools for the remainder of the year; ordered
religious gatherings to fewer than ten people in a room; and imposed a six-foot
social distancing requirement for any person not residing in the same
household. Id. at 906. This order also imposed a punishment of “up to 30 days
imprisonment, or up to $250 fine, or both.” Id.
38. Compare Wis. Off. of Dep’t of Health Serv., Emergency Order No. 28
(Apr. 16, 2020),
docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/register/2020/772a3/register/emergency_orders/p
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Palm relied solely on the powers granted to her under Chapter 252,
which allowed for a broader assertion of authority than the powers
cited in Order 12.39 Other than that difference, Order 28 was merely
an extension of the guidelines outlined in Order 12.40 At the core of
the petition was the Wisconsin Legislature’s disagreement with the
executive power exercised under Chapter 252.41
The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted the legislature’s
emergency petition and assumed jurisdiction over two issues: (1)
whether Palm violated Chapter 227, which governs emergency rulemaking, and (2) even if Palm did not violate Chapter 227, whether
Palm’s issuance of Order 28 exceeded her authority under Chapter
252 by ordering all persons to stay at home, forbidding all
nonessential travel, and closing all nonessential businesses.42

B. Suits Against Similar Stay-At-Home Orders in
Michigan and Ohio
The exact circumstances surrounding Palm were unique, but
similar suits challenging the authority of state executive branches
during COVID-19 had been brought in other states.43 For example,
the Michigan Legislature filed suit against Governor Whitmer and
challenged her authority to issue executive orders under the

he_2020_emergency_order_28/phe_2020_emergency_order_28.pdf
[perma.cc/MA9J-TC9L] [hereinafter Emergency Order No. 28], with Wis. Off.
Of Dep’t of Health Serv., Emergency Order No. 12 (Mar. 24, 2020),
docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/register/2020/771b/register/emergency_orders/ph
e_2020_emergency_order_12/phe_2020_emergency_order_12.pdf
[perma.cc/V7TC-58TD].
39. The court explained that Emergency Order 28 was “not issued by the
Governor, nor did it rely on the Governor’s emergency declaration.” Palm, 942
N.W.2d at 906. However, Emergency Order 12 was also not issued by the
Governor either, yet the Wisconsin Legislature rose no objections. Id. at 906-07.
The court further explained that Emergency Order 28 “relied solely on the
authority vested in Andrea Palm . . . including but not limited to Wis. Stat §
252.02 (3), (4) and (6).” Id. at 906. This distinction by the court made it clear
that it had an issue not with Order 28 itself, but the power that Palm used to
assert the Order.
40. Emergency Order No. 28, supra note 38.
41. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 904.
42. Id. at 907. Chief Justice Roggensack wrote both the majority opinion and
a concurring opinion. In her concurrence, she explained that although she had
just written a majority opinion striking down Emergency Order 28, she agreed
that there should be a six day stay on the judgment to allow for the Wisconsin
Legislature a draft a new law. Id. at 918-19 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring). She
explained that an immediate ruling had the possibility of “throwing the state in
chaos[,]” yet there was no stay of the judgement in the majority ruling. Id. at
919.
43. House of Representatives v. Governor, 960 N.W.2d 125 (Mich. Ct. App.
2020).
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Emergency Powers of Governor Act (“EPGA”).44 In that case,
Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency and issued a
number of executive orders.45 Similar to Palm, the lawsuit stemmed
from a dispute between Whitmer and the legislative branch
regarding the scope of the governor’s authority to issue and extend
executive orders.46 The Michigan Legislature took issue with the
broad powers granted through the EPGA, much like the Wisconsin
Legislature took issue with the broad powers granted through
Chapter 252.47
The Michigan Legislature was the body that created and later
amended the EPGA.48 The EPGA allowed Governor Whitmer to
proclaim a state of emergency and make executive orders during a
public crisis.49 The Court of Appeals of Michigan explained that the
EPGA “[did] not provide any active role for the [Michigan]
Legislature during a public emergency, let alone the power to
directly act as a check against a governor’s exercise of authority
under the EPGA.”50 This meant that the powers granted to
Governor Whitmer were exclusive.51 Those powers were codified
when the Michigan Legislature enacted the Emergency
Management Act (“EMA”).52 But under the EMA, if Governor
Whitmer wanted to extend a state of emergency past twenty-eight
days, she had to ask the legislative branch to do so.53 It is important
to note that the EMA expressly declared that it could not limit or
modify the powers enumerated to Governor Whitmer in the
EPGA.54
Pursuant to the EMA, Governor Whitmer asked the Michigan
Legislature to extend her state of emergency.55 But rather than
passing a resolution to extend it, the legislature instead introduced
a bill that sought to immediately reopen Michigan businesses.56
Governor Whitmer vetoed the bill and issued Executive Orders
2020-66 and 2020-67, the latter of which cited directly to the
44. Id. at 129.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Also similar to Palm, Governor Whitmer did not believe that the
Michigan Legislature had standing to sue her. Id. The Court of Appeals of
Michigan ruled that the legislature did have standing; just like the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that the Wisconsin legislature had standing. Id.
48. Id. at 130.
49. See id. at 130 (stating the applicable text of the EPGA).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 131.
53. Id. (“As reflected in [Section 3 of the EMA], if a governor wishes to extend
an existing state of disaster or emergency beyond 28 days, the [l]egislature must
approve the extension by resolution.”).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 132.
56. Id.
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EPGA.57 Executive Order 2020-68 then declared a new state of
emergency pursuant to Governor Whitmer’s powers under the
EMA.58 Just like the Wisconsin Legislature, these back-to-back
executive orders triggered an immediate lawsuit from the Michigan
Legislature.59
Unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Palm, when this issue
was brought to the Michigan Court of Appeals, it ruled that the
“plain and unambiguous language of the EPGA and the EMA [did]
not support the [l]egislature’s position” that Governor Whitmer had
exceeded her constitutional authority.60 It found that under the
EPGA, Governor Whitmer had the authority to declare state-wide
emergencies and promulgate reasonable orders.61 And since the
EMA could not be used to limit the EPGA, those inherent and
exclusive powers were vested to Governor Whitmer.62
When it came to the Michigan Legislature’s argument that the
EPGA was, in and of itself, unconstitutional, the Michigan Court of
Appeals disagreed.63 The court found that it was the Michigan
Legislature itself that had declared that a governor must exercise
broad police powers during a public emergency.64 Therefore, the
EPGA was not unconstitutional.65 The court concluded that
Governor Whitmer’s declaration of a state of emergency, her
extensions of the state of emergency, and her issuance of related
executive orders all fell within her scope of authority under the
EPGA.66 This ruling is contrary to the ruling in Palm, and it may
explain why the Wisconsin Legislature chose to bring suit against
DHS Secretary Palm instead of challenging the governor’s executive
powers directly.67
Also similar to Palm, Ohio Governor DeWine issued Executive
Order 2020-01D, which declared a state of emergency and delegated
57. Id.
58. Id. at 133.
59. Id. at 133; Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 904.
60. House of Representatives, 960 N.W.2d at 137.
61. Id. at 139.
62. Id. at 140-42.
63. Id. at 142, 146.
64. Id. at 144.
65. Id. at 146.
66. Id. at 145-46.
67. Chief Justice Roggensack, writing for the majority in Palm, was quick to
point out that this case was “not about [Governor Evers’] Emergency Order or
the powers of the Governor[,]” but rather, the exclusive power of Andrea Palm.
Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 904. She further emphasized that Andrea Palm is an
“unelected official,” probably to draw a distinction between Palm and the
Wisconsin legislators. Id. But Roggensack failed to include that Palm was
appointed by Evers, who was also an elected official. Gov.-elect Tony Evers
appoints former Obama administration official Andrea Palm to Cabinet,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 3, 2019), www.tmj4.com/news/local-news/tony-eversformer-obama-administration-official-andrea-palm-cabinet [perma.cc/4WKF5M8H].
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powers to the Ohio Department of Health.68 The Director of the
Department of Health, Amy Acton, created an emergency order
almost identical to Palm’s Order 28.69 Acton derived her authority
from R.C. 3701.13, which allowed health officials to make special
orders to prevent the spread of contagious or infectious diseases.70
The language in R.C. 3701.13 is very similar to the language found
in Wisconsin Chapter 252.71 In Ohio, however, the state legislature
did not challenge Acton’s order; it is impossible to know why, but it
may be because Governor DeWine is a Republican, and the
Republicans control both the Ohio House of Representatives and the
Ohio Senate.72 In contrast, Governor Whitmer of Michigan is a
Democrat, but the Michigan Senate and House of Representatives
both have Republican majorities.73 Similarly, Governor Evers of
Wisconsin is a Democrat, but the Wisconsin Legislature has
Republican majorities in both houses and, at the time of the Palm
decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had a majority of
conservative judges.74

68. Office of Governor Mike DeWine, Exec. Order No. 2020-01D (Mar. 9,
2020), www.governor.ohio.gov/wps/wcm/connect/gov/79a57015-902d-4e70-a2f1c489556bb917/Executive+Order+202001D.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPA
CE.Z18_M1HGGIK0N0JO00QO9DDDDM3000-79a57015-902d-4e70-a2f1c489556bb917-n3GDA-k [perma.cc/JV2Q-RS2R]. This executive order gave the
Ohio Department of Health the authority to “issue guidelines for private
businesses regarding appropriate work and travel restrictions” and gave state
agencies the power to “coordinate the State response to COVID-19, and to assist
in protecting the lives, safety, and health of the citizens of Ohio.” Id.
69. Ohio Off. Of Dep’t of Health, Director’s Stay at Home Order (Mar. 22,
2020),
www.content.govdelivery.com/attachments/OHOOD/2020/03/22/file_attachme
nts/1407840/Stay%20Home%20Order.pdf [perma.cc/4C9E-QD4H]. It orders
that (1) everyone in Ohio is to stay home; (2) non-essential businesses and
operation must cease; and (3) there can only be essential travel. Id.
70. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.13 (LexisNexis 2021). This statute
proclaims that the department of health “shall have supervision of all matters
relating to the preservation of the life and health of the people and have
authority in matters of quarantine to isolation.” Id.
71. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.13, with WIS. STAT. § 252.02.
72. Party Control of Ohio State Government, BALLOTPEDIA,
www.ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Ohio_state_government
[perma.cc/92WY-HRJ7] (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
73. Party Control of Michigan State Government, BALLOTPEDIA,
www.ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Michigan_state_government
[perma.cc/6DQ4-S6SW] (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
74. Party Control of Wisconsin State Government, BALLOTPEDIA,
www.ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Wisconsin_state_government
[perma.cc/6GGF-GY2K] (last visited Dec. 22, 2021); Wisconsin Supreme Court,
BALLOTPEDIA, www.ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_Supreme_Court
[perma.cc/BQA9-8RDR] (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
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C. History of the Department of Health Services’ Power
in Wisconsin
Before analyzing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling in
Palm, it is important to understand the history of Chapter 252,
which has similarities to Michigan’s EPGA and Ohio’s R.C.
3701.13.75 The predecessor of Chapter 252 did not allow for the DHS
to create and issue orders.76 The DHS could only “adopt and enforce
rules and regulations.”77 At the beginning of the AIDS epidemic in
1982, however, the Wisconsin Legislature amended the codes and
gave the DHS the ability to issue orders of state-wide application.78
With that same 1982 amendment, the Wisconsin Legislature also
added the requirement that rules of general application had to be
adopted using Chapter 227 rule-making procedure.79 This
amendment remained silent about protocols that needed to be
followed when the DHS issued state-wide executive orders.80 This
created another issue in the Palm case because there was
disagreement about whether Order 28 was a state-wide executive
order or a state-wide rule.
Interestingly, Wisconsin’s history of state health laws goes
back even further than the 1982 AIDS epidemic. In 1876, the
Wisconsin Legislature created the State Board of Health and made
it responsible for supervising the general health of the state’s
citizens.81 The legislature also granted the board unusually broad
powers, such as allowing it to impose statewide quarantines
unilaterally in times of public health emergencies.82 During the
Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918, the State Board of Health exercised
that broad authority by closing all public institutions for an
indefinite amount of time.83 Wisconsin was the only state to issue a
comprehensive state-wide order, and practically every local
government within Wisconsin immediately cooperated with the

75. WIS. STAT. § 252.02 (2020).
76. WIS. STAT. § 227.01(3) (1956).
77. Compare WIS. STAT. § 227.01(3) (1956), with WIS. STAT. § 227.01(13)
(2020).
78. See § 21, ch. 291, Laws of 1981 (showing that not only does this section
give the DHS the power to create statewide orders, § 143.02(3) gives the DHS
the express authority to close schools and forbid public gatherings to control
outbreaks and epidemics).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Steven Burg, The Virus that Shut Down Wisconsin: The Great Flu
Pandemic of 1918, WISCONTEXT (Apr. 7, 2020), www.wiscontext.org/virus-shutdown-wisconsin-great-flu-pandemic-1918 [perma.cc/BZD4-SDQV].
82. Id.
83. See Steven B. Burg, Wisconsin and the Great Spanish Flu Epidemic of
1918, WIS. MAG. OF HIST. 37, 44 (Autumn 2000) (showing headline that read
“Schools Closed to Stop Flu”).
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order.84 Just like Palm’s authority as the DHS Secretary in 2020,
one person on the 1918 State Board of Health possessed the
authority to issue state-wide health orders in times of crisis.85 The
broad authority of health experts to issue orders in times of health
crises had uninterruptedly existed in Wisconsin since 1876.86
The concept of Wisconsin’s governors delegating authority to
the DHS in order to handle a health crisis was also not new at the
time of the Palm decision. Just over a decade prior, the United
States declared a public health emergency due to an outbreak of the
Swine Influenza (a.k.a. H1N1).87 Accordingly, Wisconsin Governor
Jim Doyle issued Executive Order 280, which declared a state of
emergency and designated the DHS as the lead agency to respond.88
Per Wisconsin rules, a state of emergency could only be extended
sixty days without a joint resolution by the Wisconsin Legislature.89
When it came to Governor Doyle’s executive order and grant of
authority to the DHS, the Wisconsin Legislature did not challenge
it, but rather, it timely created Joint Resolution 94, which extended
the state of a public health emergency.90 There was never a lawsuit
brought against the DHS Secretary regarding the emergency health
orders during the Swine Influenza.91
Allowing the DHS to use its broad authority during a health
crisis had been uncontested in Wisconsin up until the decision in
Palm.92 Even modern media outlets wrote praises about Wisconsin’s
84. Id. The paper explained that Wisconsin “did not flinch in the face of
epidemic” and instead “responded with one of the most comprehensive antiinfluenza programs in the nation.” Id. The writers also noted that this
comprehensive plan would not have been made possible without the existence
of a strong state public health board and a “well-coordinated statewide public
health network.” Id.
85. Id.
86. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 944 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
87. Governor Declares Public Health Emergency, LA CROSSE TRIB. (May 1,
2009),
www.lacrossetribune.com/news/state-and-regional/wi/governordeclares-public-health-emergency/article_35a7c8fb-6dbf-51e5-956d583334bbdded.html [perma.cc/N4QP-U2GH] (explaining a national public
health emergency due to an outbreak of the H1N1 was declared in April 2009).
88. Office of Governor Jim Doyle, Exec. Order No. 280 (Apr. 13, 2009),
www.docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/executive_orders/2003_jim_doyle/2009280.pdf [perma.cc/GKL9-MSXY].
89. See § 323.10 (stating that a state of emergency shall not exceed sixty
days, unless the state of emergency is extended by joint resolution of the
legislature).
90. Assemb. J. Res. 94, 2009-2010 Wis. Leg. (Wis. 2009),
www.docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2009/related/proposals/ajr94.pdf
[perma.cc/DJB6-2QZP].
91. DHS issued guidelines about vaccinations to guard against H1N1. 2009
Seasonal Influenza Vaccination Administration, Wis. Dep’t of Health Serv.
(2009),
www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/ems/seasonalvaccine-injectable.pdf
[perma.cc/BV3P-JULK]. It stated that individuals could receive a seasonal flu
shot and a H1N1 vaccine simultaneously. Id.
92. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 943 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
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approach to the Spanish Influenza of 1918.93 Many used Wisconsin’s
approach in 1918 to predict how the state would fair during the
COVID-19 outbreak.94 Despite the historical success of Wisconsin’s
measures in 1918, the Republican-controlled legislature asked the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to strike down Palm’s Order 28 which
aimed to stop the spread of COVID-19.95 Before the order was
enacted, data found that without significant intervention, COVID19 cases were going to surge in the state of Wisconsin.96 And
following the ruling in Palm, COVID-19 cases went up significantly
in the state.97 Even after Wisconsin was deemed an epicenter of the
virus, the Wisconsin Legislature failed to deliver on its promise to
create a new law that would replace Order 28.98 The court’s decision
in Palm, combined with the Wisconsin Legislature’s lack of action,
jeopardized Wisconsinites’ safety and well-being during the
pandemic.99

93. Burg, supra note 81. On April 7, 2020, an article was published that
explained that Wisconsin was the only state in the nation to meet the Spanish
Influenza crisis with uniform and statewide measures. Id. Wisconsin’s
measures were unusual because of their aggressiveness and the public’s
compliance. Id. It is uncontested that these drastic measures helped reduce
Spanish Influenza deaths in Wisconsin. Id.
94. Jim Malewitz, Wisconsin’s Pandemic Past Offers Clues to its Coronavirus
Future,
WIS.
WATCH
(Apr.
28,
2020),
www.wisconsinwatch.org/2020/04/wisconsins-pandemic-past-and-coronavirusfuture/ [perma.cc/6L99-Q22H] (“Wisconsin in 1918 provided a clear lesson about
what unity and collective sacrifice could achieve for the common good.”).
Malewitz later explained that the 1918 pandemic is similar to COVID-19
because there were no vaccines, and the only thing that seemed to work was
social distancing and the development of herd immunity as people contracted
the disease and recovered. Id.
95. Id. Not only did the Republican legislature not like the Safer at Home
order, “an estimated 1,500 protestors, most of them not wearing face masks,
rallied at the Wisconsin State Capitol . . . demanding an end” to the Safer at
Home shutdowns. Id.
96. See id. (explaining that cases were “projected to double every 3.4 days”
and there would have been between 440 and 1,500 deaths by April 8th).
97. Tracking Coronavirus in Wisconsin: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y.
TIMES,
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/wisconsin-covid-cases.html
[perma.cc/MGZ2-MU7Q] (last visited Dec. 31, 2021) (Cases rose from 290
confirmed cases on May 13, 2020 to over 2,500 confirmed cases in October 2020).
98. Dan Shafer, Wisconsin is now the Epicenter for Coronavirus in America,
RECOMBOBULATION
AREA
(Oct.
3,
2020),
www.recombobulationarea.substack.com/p/wisconsin-is-now-the-epicenter-for
[perma.cc/F4TF-4MWV]. With a population of about 5.8 million people,
Wisconsin saw thousands of more new cases that its neighbors in Illinois,
Michigan, or Minnesota in October 2020. Id. Due to the ruling in Palm,
Wisconsin became the only state where the legislature controlled the pandemic
response. Id. Throughout the pandemic, the Wisconsin Legislature had
convened fewer than nine times, in comparison to Minnesota Legislature’s
sixty-two floor sessions, Michigan’s fifty-eight, and Iowa’s seventeen. Id.
99. Id.
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III. THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS OF THE
ISSUES PRESENTED IN PALM
The Wisconsin Legislature petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to evaluate the alleged constitutional violations raised by
DHS Secretary Palm’s issuance of Order 28. Section A of this
analysis will focus on the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision of
whether Order 28 violated the rule-making procedure of Chapter
227, as well as the dissenting opinions. Section B will analyze the
court’s decision regarding whether Palm exceeded her
constitutional authority asserted under Chapter 252 when issuing
Order 28.

A. Palm’s Issuance of Emergency Order 28 Violated
Wisconsin Chapter 227’s Rule-Making Procedure
Before deciding on the main issues, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had to rule on whether the Wisconsin Legislature even had
standing to bring suit.100 Using its rationale from Schill v. Wis.
Rapids Sch. Dist.,101 the court found that the legislature had
standing to seek judicial review simply because it had a stake in the
outcome.102 Palm contested that analysis and argued that the
legislature did not have standing to bring a claim.103
After determining standing, the court evaluated the crux of the
legislature’s claim — that Order 28 was a rule, not a state-wide
100. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 907.
101. See Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 786 N.W.2d 177 (2010) (holding
that a party will have standing to seek judicial review when they have a
personal stake in the outcome). “Wisconsin courts evaluate standing as a matter
of judicial policy rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Id. Courts are to
“construe standing broadly in favor of those seeking” to have it. Id.
102. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 907-08.
103. Id. at 907. Legal Action of Wisconsin filed an amicus memorandum in
opposition to the Legislature’s Emergency Petition. Brief for Legal Action of
Wisconsin, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Emergency Petition for the
Original Action and to Motion for Temporary Injunction, Wisconsin Legislature
v. Palm, 2020 WI 42 (2020) (No. 2020-AP-765-OA), 2020 WI S. Ct. Briefs Lexis
33. They argued that the Wisconsin Legislature only has institutional standing,
so their only protectable interest is the constitutional allocation of power, not
the protectable interest of individual Wisconsin residents. Id. at 2. The
Milwaukee Teachers’ Education Association, Madison Teachers Inc., SEIU
Healthcare Wisconsin, and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 998 all agreed.
Brief for Milwaukee Teachers’ Education, et. al., as Amici Curiae in Opposition
to Legislature’s Petition for Original Action and to Motion for Temporary
Injunction, Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42 (2020) (No. 2020-AP765-OA), 2020 WI S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 97. They argued that the legislature was
not allowed to intervene in a civil lawsuit in its own name and such intervention
can only be done by the joint committee on legislative organization on behalf of
the Legislature. Id. at 2.
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order.104 Under Chapter 227, an agency that creates a rule must get
approval from the legislature and the governor before it can be
enacted.105 Chapter 227 does allow for an exception to the rulemaking procedure if it is an emergency rule.106 But the court found
that the exception did not apply because an emergency rule could
only remain in effect for one-hundred-and-fifty days unless
extended by the legislature’s joint committee.107
The court then proceeded with its analysis of whether Order
28 was a rule.108 Chapter 227 defines a rule as a “regulation,
standard, statement of policy, or general order of general
application that has the force of law[.]”109 The Wisconsin
Legislature claimed that Order 28 was a rule because it was a
“general order of general application.”110 Palm asserted that Order
28 did not have general application because it was created to
respond to the specific and time sensitive situation of containing the
spread of COVID-19.111 The court turned to Citizens for Sensible
Zoning v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. for its explanation of the term “general
application.”112 The court found that since Order 28: (1) regulated a
general class of all people in Wisconsin; and (2) could also regulate
any persons coming into Wisconsin in the future, it had general
application.113 Due to its designation as a rule, the court deemed
that Order 28 was therefore subject to the statutory rulemaking
procedure established in Chapter 227.114 Because Palm issued
Order 28 without the legislature’s approval, the court found that
she violated Chapter 227, and as a result, Order 28 was
unenforceable.115
104. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 908.
105. WIS. STAT. § 227.24 (2019). This statute also requires an agency making
an emergency rule to: (1) prepare a statement of the scope of the emergency
rule; (2) obtain approval of the statement; (3) and hold a preliminary public
hearing and comment period; (4) submit the emergency rule in final draft form
to the governor for approval; (5) prepare a plain language analysis of the rule;
and (6) prepare a fiscal estimate for the rule. Id.
106. Id. at § 227.24(1)(a).
107. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 911; see § 227.24(1)(c) (stating that a rule
promulgated under paragraph (a) takes effect upon publication in the official
state newspaper or on any later date specified in the rule and, except as
provided under sub. (2), remains in effect only for 150 days).
108. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 908.
109. § 227.01(13).
110. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 908.
111. Id. at 909.
112. Id.; see Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 280
N.W.2d 702, 707-08 (Wis. 1979) (finding that “[e]ven though an application
applies only to persons within a small class, the action is of general application
if that class is described in general terms and new members can be added to the
class.”).
113. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 910.
114. Id. at 914.
115. Id.
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Justices Dallet and Hagedorn dissented on this issue. First,
Justice Dallet disagreed with the court’s conclusion that Order 28
was a rule.116 She believed that the majority misinterpreted
Chapter 227 and did not consider how it could work together with
the language in Chapter 252.117 She wrote that the majority
misinterpreted an “order made applicable to the whole” to be
synonymous with a “general order of general application.”118
According to the majority opinion, she claimed, “any order
applicable to the whole state would be a rule.”119 But she argued
that the creation of Chapter 252 explicitly gave the DHS the power
to issue state-wide orders, which are different than rules.120 She
further explained that the majority’s interpretation of Chapter 227
made the word “order” in Chapter 252 “superfluous” and created a
system in which executive departments could only promulgate rules
rather than giving them the discretion to create state-wide orders
or create rules.121 She emphasized that the court could not allow
statutory redundancies just for the sake of aligning Chapter 227
with a brand new policy preference.122
Justice Dallet concluded that the Wisconsin Legislature had
given the DHS the authority to promulgate a rule under Chapter
227 and later gave it separate power to issue state-wide orders
under Chapter 252.123 As far as policy, She explained that the rulemaking process in Wisconsin was too time consuming and argued
that the DHS should not always have to follow rule-making
procedures.124 She noted that this was especially true since Order
28 was created as an immediate response to COVID-19 and not as
guidance that would be used for any future contagion.125
116. Id. at 947 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. The language “order made applicable to the whole” was used in
Citizens, and Justice Dallet argued it was much different than the phrase
“general rule of general application.” Id.; Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 280
N.W.2d at 707-08.
119. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 946.
120. Id. at 945-46.
121. Id. at 947-48; § 252.02(4) (explaining that the DHS “may promulgate
and enforce rules or issue orders for guarding against the introduction of any
communicable disease into the state, for the control and suppression of
communicable diseases, for the quarantine and disinfection of persons . . . and
for the sanitary care of . . . schools, and public buildings . . . .”).
122. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 947-48; State ex. rel. Kalel v. Cir. Court for Dane
Cnty., 681 N.W.2d 110, 124 (2004) (“Statutory language is read where possible
to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage.”).
123. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 947-49.
124. Id. at 948. Judge Dallet also believed that the majority’s reading of §
252.02 created a “time-consuming, lengthy rulemaking scheme inconsistent
with the authorization for [the] DHS to act immediately and summarily to
guard against the introduction of communicable disease as well as to control
and suppress it.” Id.
125. Id. at 949.
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Justice Hagedorn also wrote a dissenting opinion on this
issue.126 He explained that “general order” simply meant an order
as applied generally throughout the state to all persons and places
of employment.127 This meant that some general orders could be
rules, but that not all of them would be.128 He further explained that
if all general orders had to be promulgated as rules, the creation of
Chapter 252 made no sense.129 He believed that the Wisconsin
Legislature did not address the “overwhelming textual evidence”
that explained what “general order” meant for the purposes of
Chapter 227.130 He went on to write that the legislature never
attempted to give a separate meaning to “general order,” nor did “it
engage in any statutory analysis regarding its interpretation.”131 He
agreed with Justice Dallet that Order 28 was temporary and
designed to specifically address the COVID-19 pandemic.132 For
that reason, he would have ruled that Order 28 did not have general
application, and it therefore did not meet the definition of a rule
under Chapter 227.133 In general, the dissenting justices would have
interpreted Order 28 as a statewide order, not as a rule. This
classification would have made Order 28 exempt from Chapter 227
rulemaking procedures134 and validated the executive power of the
DHS.

B. Even if Palm Did Not Violate Chapter 227, Her
Issuance of Order 28 Exceeded the DHS Powers
Under Chapter 252
When Palm issued Order 28, she cited Chapter 252 for
authority.135 Chapter 252 states, in part, that any order made by
the DHS can be applicable to the whole or any specified part of the
state.136 Another part of the chapter states that the DHS can
authorize and implement all emergency measures needed to control
communicable diseases.137 Palm argued that, under Chapter 252,
she had the authority to issue a statewide order without having to
follow Chapter 227 rule-making procedure.138 The court concluded
that no act or order of the DHS, even pursuant to Chapter 252, was
126. Id. at 951-52 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 961.
128. Id. at 961-62.
129. Id. at 962.
130. Id. at 963.
131. Id. at 964.
132. Id. at 968.
133. Id.
134. WIS. STAT. § 227.
135. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 909.
136. WIS. STAT. § 252.02(4) (2020).
137. WIS. STAT. § 252.02(6) (2020).
138. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 912.
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exempt from its now expanded definition of a rule.139
The court even employed the constitutional doubt principle.140
It reiterated that Palm asserted broad authority under Chapter 252
when she “implement[ed] all emergency measures necessary to
control communicable diseases.”141 The court believed that her
assertion of power was constitutionally suspect.142 It emphasized
that Chapter 252 could not be construed as an open-ended grant of
police powers to a cabinet secretary.143 The court went on to explain
that through the delegation doctrine, the legislature could delegate
rule-making powers to an agency like the DHS, but that the DHS
must follow procedural safeguards like those found in Chapter
227.144 The court found that on the powers Palm claimed under
Chapter 252, she could not show any valid procedural safeguards
besides judicial review.145 The court did not believe that judicial
review was enough because it traditionally takes place after an
alleged right has already been violated.146 In totality, the court’s
ruling rendered the power to make executive orders under Chapter
252’s virtually useless.
Furthermore, the court believed that the issuance of Order 28
went beyond any powers authorized in Chapter 252.147 The Order
issued all people within the State of Wisconsin to stay home or at
their place of residence, rather than just people who were infected
with COVID-19.148 The Order also prohibited all public and private
gatherings of any number of people that were not part of a single
household, not just those infected with COVID-19.149 The court
interpreted this language as exceeding the power granted in
Chapter 252 because it believed the power to restrict movement was
only to apply to infected persons.150 The court further emphasized
139. Id.
140. See id. (explaining that the constitutional doubt principle disfavors
“statutory interpretations that unnecessarily raise serious constitutional
questions about the statute under consideration”).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 913.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 916; see WIS. STAT. § 252.02(4) (2020) (stating that the
department may issue orders for any city, village or county by service upon the
local health officer).
148. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 916; Emergency Order No. 28, supra note 38 (“All
individuals present within the State of Wisconsin are ordered to stay at home
or at their place of residence, with the exceptions outlined below.”).
149. Emergency Order No. 28, supra note 38 (“All public and private
gatherings of any number of people that are not part of a single household or
living unit are prohibited, except for the limited purposes expressly permitted
in this Order.”).
150. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 916; WIS. STAT. § 252.02(4) (2020) (“[T]he
department may promulgate and enforce rules or issue orders for . . . the
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that preventing all forms of travel and closing businesses went well
beyond protecting against the entry of communicable diseases in
the state.151 Since Palm cited no other authority for the issuance of
Order 28 outside of Chapter 252, the court ordered to strike it
down.152
The court also took issue with the criminal penalties that
Order 28 imposed.153 For example, one of the penalties for violating
Order 28 was imprisonment of up to thirty days.154 The court
explained that to constitute criminal conduct, the conduct must be
set out with specificity and give fair warning.155 The court found
that it had “long been the law in Wisconsin that in order for” a
violation of an emergency order to constitute a crime, the order
must have been promulgated as a rule.156 Therefore, Palm could not
assert that Order 28 was an order justified under Chapter 252
powers, but also assert the power to create criminal penalties for
violations of the order.157 In conclusion, the court reasoned that the
inclusion of criminal penalties meant Palm could not derive any
power from Chapter 252, and Order 28 had to follow Chapter 227
rule-making procedure.
Justices Dallet and Hagedorn dissented on this issue. In her
dissent, Justice Dallet wrote that because the legislature created
Chapter 252 to give the DHS Secretary the explicit authority to
issue orders without first going through the rule-making process,
the majority’s decision failed.158 She turned to the decision in
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., in which the United States
Supreme Court recognized that “it [is] appropriate and reasonable
to vest a board of health with the authority to respond to an
epidemic of disease because it is composed of persons in the affected
locality who presumably have fitness to determine such
questions.”159 Justice Dallet looked at the plain language of Chapter
252 and asserted that the legislature had plainly granted the DHS
quarantine and disinfection of persons . . . infected or suspected of being infected
by a communicable disease[.]”).
151. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 916.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 913.
154. Id.; Emergency Order No. 28, supra note 38 (“Violation or obstruction
of this Order is punishable by up to 30 days imprisonment, or up to $250 fine,
or both.”).
155. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 913.
156. Id. (citing HM Distribs. Of Milwaukee v. Dep’t of Ag., 198 N.W.2d 598,
602-03 (1972)) (The court here discussed a contention that criminal penalties
were not proper because the administrative regulation was not properly
promulgated as a rule); see also State v. Lambert, 229, N.W.2d 622, 624 (1979)
(explaining that criminal conduct can follow from a properly promulgated rule).
157. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 913-14.
158. Id. at 943 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 944 (citing Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27
(1905)).

112

UIC Law Review

[55:94

the power to address COVID-19 by issuing orders or rules.160 She
explained that the word “or” in the language of Chapter 252
distinguished orders from rules.161
She emphasized the history of the statute by reminding the
court that the legislature itself expanded Chapter 252 in 1982
during the AIDS epidemic.162 She explained that it explicitly
granted the DHS the ability to issue orders of state-wide
application.163 She also highlighted the later language in Chapter
252, which allowed the department to “authorize and implement all
emergency measures necessary to control communicable
diseases.”164 She emphasized that Chapter 252 independently
provided authority for the issuance of several provisions of Order 28
without rule-making.165 It allowed the “DHS to ‘close schools and
forbid public gatherings . . . in churches and other places to control
outbreaks and epidemics.’”166 Lastly, she argued that if the majority
thought the criminal sanctions in Order 28 were unconstitutional,
it should have struck the sanctions and left the rest of the Order
intact.167
Justice Hagedorn believed that the issue of whether the powers
granted in Chapter 252 were too broad should have been left for
another day.168 He believed the court had “no business raising and
deciding claims to vindicate the rights of parties” that were not
before the court.169 He believed that the issue of whether an
executive branch officer could shut down businesses, limit travel,
and forbid public gatherings were not adequately before the
court.170 He explained that by taking up the issue, the court allowed
the Wisconsin Legislature to argue its own laws as
unconstitutional.171 He argued that although the legislature may
have had “buyer’s remorse” for the broad discretion it gave to the
DHS through Chapter 252, those were the laws it drafted and the
court must read them faithfully.172 He explained that the
legislature had petitioned the court on two narrow issues.173
160. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 945.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 945-46.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 946-47. She also explained that the “very broad language of §
252.02(6) to ‘authorize and implement all emergency measures necessary’
include[d] the issuance of emergency orders necessary to combat a deadly
virus.” Id. (quoting § 252.02(6)).
165. Id. at 947.
166. Id. (quoting § 252.02(3)).
167. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 949.
168. Id. at 953 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 952.
171. Id. at 952-53.
172. Id. at 953.
173. Id. at 975.
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Neither issue involved a determination of how the DHS could
exercise powers under Chapter 252.174 He thought the legislature
asked the court to address only whether Order 28 went beyond
statutory powers.175 For those reasons, he did not agree with the
majority partaking in such a broad constitutional analysis.176

IV. HOW THE COURT IN PALM SHOULD HAVE RULED
This section will explain where the court erred in its decision
in Palm. First, it wrongly decided that Order 28 was a rule, and that
decision created a dangerous precedent that rule-making
procedures must be followed even during emergencies.177 Second, it
used a flawed statutory analysis and incorrectly found that Order
28 exceeded powers granted under Chapter 252.178 Both of these
decisions led to Order 28 being struck down in its entirety with
nothing in its place.179 The lack of a cohesive state-wide order left
many Wisconsinites vulnerable to contracting COVID-19.180

A. Order 28 Was Not a Rule and Even if it Was,
Emergency Orders Made to Control Public Health
Emergencies Should Not Have to Follow Chapter
227 Procedure
The court in Palm grossly mischaracterized Order 28 as a rule
because of an incomplete statutory analysis. According to Chapter
227, a “rule” is a regulation, standard, statement of policy, or
general order of general application that has the force of law and is
issued by an agency to govern.181 Looking at that statute alone, it

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. He believed that the executive branch overreach could be challenged
only “by those who are harmed by the executive branch action.” Id. He went on
to explain that “[e]xcept in unusual cases, the lawmaking body is not injured in
its lawmaking functions by executive branch enforcement gone awry.” Id. Also,
Order 28 did not impede on the Legislature’s ability to work because its work
was deemed essential by Palm. Emergency Order No. 28, supra note 38.
177. Id. at 918.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See ‘Everyone is Concerned’ Over Lack of Statewide COVID-19 Plan,
Say Dane County, Public Health Leaders, WIS. HEALTH NEWS (May 20, 2020),
www.wisconsinhealthnews.com/2020/05/20/everyone-is-concerned-over-lack-ofstatewide-covid-19-plan-say-dane-county-public-health-leaders/
[perma.cc/M4TW-9Y7B] (stating that Public Health Madison and Dane County
Director Janel Heinrich said that multiple “public health leaders across the
state” were concerned that there was no state-wide order because the lack of an
order could lead to significant spread).
181. § 227.01(14).
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could be argued that Order 28 was a rule because it was a “general
order of general application.”182 But although Order 28 applied to
all citizens of Wisconsin, it was only meant to address the
containment of COVID-19.183 The DHS was not, for example,
ordering that the declaration of any public health emergency in
Wisconsin would result in people needing to stay home and limit
travel. An order of that kind would be closer to a rule of general
application; but even that order should not trigger the rule-making
procedure of Chapter 227 because it deals only with public health
emergencies. The court analyzed the language of Chapter 227 too
broadly when it defined an emergency health order as a “general
order of general application.”184
Further, the Wisconsin Legislature itself created Chapter 252
to give the DHS power to issue state-wide orders.185 Why would the
Wisconsin Legislature allow state-wide orders in Chapter 252 if all
state-wide orders are considered rules under Chapter 227? Clearly,
the legislature felt that Chapter 227 did not apply to statewide
orders, and that is why Chapter 252 was created. As Justice Dallet
alluded to throughout her dissent, if Order 28 was viewed as a
“general order of general application” simply because it applied to
all Wisconsinites, it would make Chapter 252 completely
superfluous.186 The Wisconsin Supreme Court disregarded that all
statutes must be read “to give reasonable effect to every word, in
order to avoid surplusage.”187 When read together, Chapter 227 and
Chapter 252 make clear that all rules created by executive agencies
will need to follow Chapter 227 rule-making procedure, but statewide orders created under Chapter 252 authority are not subjected
to that same procedure.
The court in Palm did not properly analyze Order 28 or the
interplay between Chapter 227 procedure and Chapter 252’s grant
of power to the DHS. Instead, the court used the broad definition of
a rule found in Citizens and applied it to Order 28.188 In Citizens,
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) issued an
order which fixed the limits of a flood plain in Columbia County.189
The court in Citizens explained that although the flood plain zoning
ordinance applied only to land within the flood plain and only
affected those persons with a legal interest in such land, “a rule
182. Emergency Order No. 28, supra note 38.
183. Id.
184. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 947-48 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
185. WIS. STAT. § 252.02 (2020).
186. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 947-48 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 946. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 176 (2012) (stating that “legal drafters
should not include words that have no effect, courts avoid a reading that renders
some words altogether redundant”).
188. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 909.
189. Citizens for Sensible Zoning, 280 N.W. 2d at 704.
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need not apply to all persons within the state” in order to trigger
Chapter 227 procedure.190 The court explained that an action is of
“general application” if a “class is described in general terms and
new members can be added to the class.”191 The court in Palm used
that definition and found that because Order 28 applied to all people
within Wisconsin, as well as any new member who entered the
state, it had to be a rule of general application.192
What the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Palm failed to explain
though, is how a rule establishing a permanent flood plain was
analogous to the DHS ordering people to stay at home to try and
stop the spread of a deadly virus. In theory, COVID-19 would
eventually end or be better understood, rendering Order 28 useless.
That scenario is much different than the creation of a permanent
flood plain.193 There are no similarities between the rule issued by
the DNR in Citizens and Order 28. Also, the legislature did not
grant the DNR the same authority it granted to the DHS through
Chapter 252. The court in Palm did not even begin to analyze those
key differences, and instead used Citizens as precedent to
determine whether something was a rule.194 This lack of deeper
analysis is what led to Order 28 being struck down in its entirety.
This decision created a dangerous precedent that even in times
of crisis, the DHS must go through Chapter 227 rule-making
procedure.195 Simply put, that notion is absurd and endangers the
safety of all Wisconsinites. There is no telling of how long the
rulemaking process can take, and the DHS should not have to wait.
By forcing the DHS to go through the formalities of the rulemaking
process, it puts all Wisconsinites at risk of contracting and
spreading a deadly virus. With how little was known about COVID19 at the time Palm issued Order 28, swift action was needed. This
order was created even before the CDC directed Americans to wear
masks, which left social distancing and quarantining as the only
viable option to stop the spread.196 Rather than correctly evaluating
Order 28 as a statewide order or evaluating the Order under
Chapter 252, the court insisted on classifying it as a rule. The court
should have recognized that forcing the DHS to follow Chapter 227
procedure was counterproductive to the state’s mission of keeping
190. Id. at 707.
191. Id. at 707-08.
192. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 909.
193.
See
Encyclopedic
Entry,
NAT’L
GEO.,
www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/flood-plain/ [perma.cc/4Z7F-PNN3]
(defining a flood plain as “a generally flat area of land next to a river or
stream.”).
194. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 909.
195. Id. at 918.
196. CDC Calls on Americans to Wear Masks to Prevent COVID-19 Spread,
CDC NEWSROOM (July 14, 2020), www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0714americans-to-wear-masks.html [perma.cc/48U2-5VQV].
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its citizens safe. The finding that Order 28 violated Chapter 252 was
especially troubling since the lawsuit was not brought by a
concerned citizen, but instead, by the completely unaffected
Wisconsin Legislature.197

B. Palm’s Issuance of Order 28 Fell Squarely Within
Her Power Granted Through Chapter 252
Rather than evaluate how Chapter 227 and Chapter 252 could
be read together, the majority in Palm decided to make the broad
conclusion that Order 28 violated both chapters.198 Chapter 252
stated in part that the DHS could promulgate and enforce rules
(that would fall under Chapter 227 procedure) or issue orders to
control and suppress communicable diseases.199 The court argued
that no orders the DHS made could be exempt from its definition of
a rule.200 That conclusion was not consistent with sound statutory
analysis. If the legislature intended for every DHS order to be
promulgated as a rule, it would not have included the phrase “or
issue orders” in the statute.201 Just as the court did when evaluating
Chapter 227, it interpreted Chapter 252 in a way that created
surplusage. The legislature included the language “or issue orders”
in the statute, and the court should have given meaning to every
word of the statute. It was well within the legislature’s power to
amend Chapter 252 or create a statute that overruled it entirely.
Rather than allowing the legislature to amend its own laws, the
court took it upon itself to change the meaning of a clear and
unambiguous statute.
The court should have found that, even if Order 28 was issued
without following Chapter 227 rule-making procedure, it was still
valid under Palm’s Chapter 252 powers. As noted earlier, forcing
the DHS to follow Chapter 227 rule-making procedure during a
public health emergency can have devastating results. That seems
to be the very conflict that Chapter 252 was meant to remedy.
Chapter 252 gave the DHS the authority to issue state-wide orders
to contain a communicable disease. That was not only clear in the
statute, but also could have been validated if the court would have
looked at the history of the DHS powers in Wisconsin. The court
197. Emergency Order No. 28, supra note 38. Per Order 28, the duties of
the Wisconsin legislature would have been deemed as essential, meaning they
would not have to stay home. Id.
198. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 918.
199. § 252.02(4).
200. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 912.
201. WIS. STAT. § 252.02(4) (2020) (“[T]he department may promulgate and
enforce rules or issue orders for guarding against the introduction of any
communicable disease into the state, [or] for the control and for suppression of
communicable diseases.”).
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instead seemed more concerned with the constitutionality of an
“unelected official” issuing state-wide orders.202 But the court failed
to mention that the citizens of Wisconsin elected Governor Evers,
and with him, came his selection of DHS Secretary Palm.
Wisconsinites must be able to trust the DHS Secretary rather than
have to worry about their own state legislature lodging claims
against her every time it disagrees with her.
Not only should Wisconsinites be able to trust the DHS
Secretary, but they should be able to trust the laws created by their
legislative branch. All members of the legislature were elected
specifically to create sound laws. There is no legitimacy to a judicial
system that allows a legislative branch to bring lawsuits against an
executive branch official for following a statute it created. Further,
the Wisconsin Legislature failed to even attempt to create a law to
replace Order 28, which further delegitimized the entire system.203
The court in this case had an opportunity to uphold at least some
parts of Order 28. The court’s concerns over the criminal sanctions
imposed through Order 28 could have easily been remedied by
striking down only that portion of the Order. Chapter 252, combined
with the authority granted to the DHS by the governor to take “all
necessary and appropriate measures to prevent and respond to
incidents of COVID-19,” was surely enough to conclude that Order
28 was valid, at least in part.204
Palm should not serve as sound precedent for future public
health emergencies. When it comes to pandemics, the DHS should
have the power to issue swift and comprehensive state-wide orders
that aim to limit the spread. Instead of following sound statutory
analysis, the court was influenced by the reasoning of some justices
that did not believe COVID-19 was a serious issue.205 In reality,
202. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 910.
203. Eric Litke, Fact Check: Wisconsin Legislators Have Gone About 6
Months Without Passing a Bill, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2020),
www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/10/07/fact-check-wisconsinlegislators-havent-passed-bill-since-april/5917707002/
[perma.cc/Y3HUEEU6].
204. Exec. Order No. 72, supra note 10.
205. See generally Kent Wainscott, Chief Justice: COVID-19 Spread at
Meatpacking Plant not Affecting Regular Folks, WISN 12 NEWS (May 6, 2020),
www.wisn.com/article/coronavirus-chief-justice-spread-at-meatpacking-plantnot-affecting-regular-folks/32393991 [perma.cc/7TBC-MTAG] (writing that
during oral arguments, Chief Justice Roggensack said in regard to the spread
of COVID-19 in Brown County: “[the spread is] due to the meatpacking though,
that’s where [sic] Brown County got the flare. It wasn’t just the regular folks in
Brown County.”). Many people found that comment offensive and an advocate
for meatpacking workers, Christine Neumann-Ortiz, found the comment to be
racist and elitist. Id. Also during oral arguments, Justice Bradley compared the
stay-at-home order to Japanese internment during World War II. Devan Cole,
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Invokes Internment of Japanese-Americans in
Debate Over State’s Stay-at-Home Order, CNN (May 5, 2020),
www.cnn.com/2020/05/05/politics/wisconsin-supreme-court-coronavirus-
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there should not have been standing; the statutory language was
clear; and Order 28 was constitutionally sound. Unfortunately for
Wisconsinites, the Wisconsin Supreme Court chose to ignore those
facts.

V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PALM DECISION
The court in Palm chose to engage in judicial activism and
strike down a statutorily valid exercise of executive power. The
court chose to protect the interests of the legislature instead of the
interests of the citizens within the state. This decision contributed
to Reuters deeming Wisconsin an “epicenter of the pandemic in the
United States.”206 The lack of a legislative replacement for Order 28
left thousands of Wisconsinites dead due to COVID-19.207 Although
the court could not have predicted the future of COVID-19, it should
have realized the impact its decision was going to have on the state.
Instead of trusting the DHS, the court trusted the legislature to
create a better plan. The failure of both branches of the Wisconsin
government created a deadly precedent that cannot be relied upon
in the future.
Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened. As the
pandemic continues to plague the country, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court continues to strike down executive orders as unlawful.208
Governor Evers tried to create a state-wide mask mandate, but it
was struck down.209 The court essentially used the same reasoning,
hearing-japanese-american-internment/index.html
[perma.cc/VJ7Z-NKJP].
This comment caught the attention of Actor George Takei who wrote a book
about his time in a Japanese internment camp. Mary Spicuzza, Actor George
Takei Slams Wisconsin Justice Rebecca Bradley for Repeatedly Comparing
Stay-at-Home Order to Internment Camp, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 14,
2020),
www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/05/14/george-takei-slamsjustice-rebecca-bradley-tweet/5190243002/
[perma.cc/FL7L-VAJM].
Takei
tweeted that being in his own home watching Netflix was nothing like an
internment camp. George Takei (@GeorgeTakei), TWITTER (May 14, 2020, 9:30
AM), twitter.com/GeorgeTakei/status/1260940615363317760.
206. Brendan O’Brien & Maria Caspani, COVID-19 Cases Surge in
Wisconsin Ahead of Trump Campaign Rally, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2020),
www.reuters.com/article/healthcoronavirus-usa/refile-not-fake-news-covid-19cases-surge-in-wisconsin-ahead-of-trump-campaign-rally-idUSL1N2H703M
[perma.cc/9ED7-TVJ8] (“[T]he state’s department of health services reported
grim records as daily COVID-19 cases reached 3,861 and the seven-day average
of new confirmed cases topped 3,000 for the first time.”).
207. COVID-19: Wisconsin Deaths, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERV.,
www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/deaths.htm [perma.cc/6WH9-ZGY6] (last
updated Dec. 22, 2021).
208. Wisconsin Supreme Court Strikes Down Mask Executive Orders as
“Unlawful”,
WBAY
NEWS
(Mar.
31,
2021),
www.wbay.com/2021/03/31/wisconsin-supreme-court-to-rule-on-gov-eversmask-mandate/ [perma.cc/6S97-GMDZ].
209. Id.
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arguing that an executive order creating a mask mandate exceeds
executive authority and violates the separation of powers
doctrine.210 This decision has led to confusion and has forced
individual counties to try and enforce mask mandates.211 The Palm
decision highlights the pitfalls of judicial activism during a global
pandemic. The judicial system should not be used to strike down
orders simply because it may be politically unfavorable, but that is
what continues to happen in Wisconsin.

210. Id.
211. As of December 2021, the two largest counties in the State of Wisconsin
have differing mandates. Dane County makes people wear masks indoors, but
Milwaukee County has no mask mandate. COVID-19, City of Milwaukee Health
Dep’t, city.milwaukee.gov/coronavirus [perma.cc/4E9Q-N7VW (last visited Dec.
23, 2021); Current Order, Madison & Dane Cnty. Pub. Health,
www.publichealthmdc.com/coronavirus/current-order [perma.cc/JAV3-GK8L]
(last visited Dec. 23, 2021).

